Juan Negri

Javier Milei’s rise to power in Argentina one year ago drew significant attention to the future of the country’s political dynamics. As a textbook outsider with no prior political experience, he led a party (La Libertad Avanza, “Freedom advances”) that was an ad hoc coalition of newcomers, ideologues, and second-tier politicians—far from resembling an institutionalized party. Furthermore, he faced a significant lack of institutional support, holding only a minority of seats in both houses of Congress. Javier Milei’s legislative bloc consisted of 37 deputies of his own (barely reaching 15% of the chamber) and 7 senators (just under 10% of the seats). In addition, 47% of the deputies and 71% of the senators of La Libertad Avanza occupy office for the first time. This raised widespread doubts about his ability to advance his radical agenda in such a constrained legislative environment. 

One year later, however, it is clear that Milei has managed to establish a “minimum formula” for governability within the legislative arena. Despite the challenges, the administration secured necessary support for key initiatives. 

Legislative dynamics

The most significant legislative efforts by the Executive were “Decree 70” and the “Fundamentals Act” (Ley Bases). Decree 70/2023, titled “Bases for the Reconstruction of the Argentine Economy,” and known colloquially as the “Mega-decree” given its scope, was signed by President Javier Milei on December 20, 2023. Comprising 366 articles, it aimed at deregulating the Argentine economy by modifying or repealing existing laws and decrees. Key provisions include making contracts between privates easier to celebrate, allowing state-owned enterprises to become private corporations subject to market risks, reducing compensation for terminated employees, permitting workers to choose their healthcare providers and abolishing rent control regulations. The decree remains in effect, as it can only be overturned if both houses of Congress reject it. As of now, only the Senate has voted against it. The main veto point so far has been the judicial branch. Notably, the labor reforms introduced by the decree have been suspended due to at least six judicial injunctions, including those filed by major labor unions such as the CGT and CTA. In some instances, courts have declared these reforms unconstitutional. Despite these suspensions, the other aspects of the decree remain in effect. 

At its turn, the “Ley de Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Libertad de los Argentinos” (literally “Law of Foundations and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentines”) was proposed by the government in late 2023. Initially comprising 664 articles covering diverse topics like economic emergency, administrative reorganization, and privatizations, it failed in a detailed vote in February 2024. A streamlined version of 238 articles, focused on state reform, labor modernization, energy policy, and investment incentives (RIGI), was later introduced. Key changes included removing certain companies from privatization lists, maintaining pension moratoriums, and ensuring protections for cultural entities and public works contracts. The Senate introduced additional modifications, such as limiting RIGI to specific sectors (agriculture, energy, mining, technology) and supporting local suppliers, which were accepted by the Chamber of Deputies after a 14-hour session, culminating in the law’s promulgation on July 8, 2024. 

The instruments used for Milei´s moderate legislative success have been (and probably will continue to be), in the first place, a decisive use of presidential legislative powers, as already suggested when describing the “Mega-decree”.

In the second place, Milei has been successful in building ad-hoc legislative coalitions that profited from the willingness of opposition parties in collaborating legislatively with Milei despite their differences. All his took place in a context of political polarization, low Congressional productivity and legislative deadlock, which predates the current administration.

With no single party holding a majority, negotiations have become a critical component of policymaking. Milei’s administration has had to navigate a complex web of alliances, often resorting to transactional politics to achieve its legislative goals.  

Presidential legislative powers: Constitutional Decree Authority

Both the executive´s veto and decree powers were pivotal in navigating tensions with Congress amidst a polarized political landscape. Argentina´s executive has the constitutional right to issue decrees, technically labelled “decrees of necessity and urgency” (DNU). In order to decrees to be overturned they need to be explicitly rejected by both chambers of Congress. 

During his first year in office, Milei issued a total of 51 decrees. Although lower than his predecessor Alberto Fernández (who in a COVID 19 pandemic context issued a record high of 78 decrees), Milei´s numbers are significantly higher than Mauricio Macri and Cristina Fernández during their first year in office. This figure highlights an intensive use of this tool to implement structural reforms and public policy decisions with minimal congressional approval.

Key areas addressed by Milei’s DNUs include Fiscal Reform (elimination of taxes and reduction of energy subsidies), State Restructuring (Merging ministries and deregulating the economy) and Social Policies (Modifications to social assistance programs). 

Milei’s reliance on DNUs raises critical questions about the role of Congress in Argentina’s democratic framework. From a normative point of view, DNUs are reserved for emergencies where legislative approval cannot be obtained in a timely manner. Milei’s use of this tool for broad policy reforms—such as fiscal adjustments and state restructuring—represents a deepening of a previous tradition of Presidents who use the tool to advance ordinary legislation. The justification of urgency is a contentious point. The frequent use of DNUs drew criticism from the opposition, which accused Milei of power concentration, erosion of democratic principles and debate and that bypassing Congress sets a dangerous precedent for future administrations. However, the administration justified this approach citing the urgency to implement measures in the context of an economic crisis. Eventually, the Supreme Court’s role in adjudicating challenges to these DNUs will be pivotal in determining the limits of executive power.

Milei also vetoed two bills passed by Congress: The University budget and the Retirement system reform bills. By comparison, Alberto Fernández did not veto any bill during his administration’s first year, while Mauricio Macri and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner used veto power one time each during the same time.

The strategic use of vetoes served multiple purposes for Milei. Politically, it allowed him to maintain a cohesive narrative of fiscal responsibility and market liberalization. Institutionally, it demonstrated his willingness to exercise the full extent of his constitutional powers.

However, this approach also exacerbated tensions with Congress. Indeed, the reliance on vetoes to counter opposition-led legislation indicates a governance approach that, while assertive, may strain future collaborative efforts essential for democratic processes.

Legislative coalitions: An endless bargaining

Milei’s legislative success is surprising, considering that the governing party did not even possess the veto legislator in Congress. It lacked both the median legislator (necessary to pass legislation) and the pivotal legislator capable of resisting a veto. In other words, the administration faced a double disadvantage: it neither controlled the median legislator to secure legislative approval nor possessed the veto power to shield its policies from Congressional insistence. This placed the government at significant risk of being entirely subordinated to Congress—a situation often referred to as a “congressional minority“. 

To achieve his legislative goals, Milei relied on the support of lawmakers from Propuesta Republicana (Pro), former President Mauricio Macri’s party. The relationship between the two parties—and their respective leaders—has been marked by mutual necessity and distrust. Milei needed Macri’s support to prevent Congress from overriding presidential vetoes and to pass legislation. For its part, Pro (both its lawmakers and voters) shares much of Milei’s program, Macri and his party feel vindicated by his rise to power after the latter´s failure to secure reelection in 2019 with a similar platform, and, most importantly, shares Milei’s voters’ deep desire to keep Peronism out of power. However, Milei distrusts Macri’s early suggestions that Pro should co-govern. At the same time, Macri fears that Milei aims to absorb Pro into a broader right-wing coalition leaded by LLA, thereby diminishing Macri’s influence and ascendancy.

This has resulted in a rocky relationship of both legislative collaboration and verbal attack. The only significant defeat suffered by the ruling party was when its main ally, PRO, led by Mauricio Macri, overturned the DNU that allocated billions in funds to the SIDE (Argentina’s intelligence agency). The Senate did the same. That marked one of the government’s worst weeks in Congress. 2025 is also a mid-term electoral year and one of the questions is whether both parties will run in a coalition or not.  

Legislative Productivity

Executive initiative has been rather scanty. In a scenario of party institutionalization and party discipline decline, legislative productivity in the argentine Congress has been decreasing for the last years. In this context, it comes as no surprise that 2024 it was not a significantly productive year. In 2024, the Argentine Congress approved 44 laws, with a significant portion—36—originating from the Executive branch. Notably, only 3 of these were directly authored by President Milei, while the remaining 33 were holdovers from previous administrations. This indicates that, despite the Executive’s proactive stance, much of the legislative output was influenced by prior governmental agendas. The opposition successfully passed 8 laws; however, the administration vetoed the two most significant ones concerning pension formulas and university budgets, underscoring the Executive’s decisive control over legislative outcomes. 

The administration’s reliance on legacy legislation from previous governments reflects both an initial inertia within the legislative process and the challenges of advancing a wholly new agenda in a highly polarized Congress. 

The legislative year comprised 24 sessions, including regular, special, and informative meetings. The predominance of special sessions, a trend observed in recent years, suggests a strategic approach to legislative scheduling, allowing for targeted discussions on specific agendas. This method can expedite priority issues but may also limit broader legislative debate.

The legislative period concluded with several critical matters unresolved:

• Clean Record Law: Aimed at ensuring the integrity of candidates, this proposal seeks to establish criteria to disqualify individuals with certain legal convictions from running for public office.
• 2025 Budget: The delay in approving the national budget poses challenges for fiscal planning and government operations, highlighting potential gridlocks in financial governance.
• Access to Public Information Decree: A decree limiting public access to information remains unreviewed, raising concerns about transparency and accountability in government operations.

Comparative Analysis with Previous Administrations

When compared to prior administrations, Milei’s first year exhibits both continuities and departures in legislative strategy:

• Use of DNUs and Vetoes: While previous presidents have utilized DNUs and vetoes, Milei’s frequency and context of use suggest a more assertive approach to bypassing legislative hurdles.
• Legislative Output: The number of laws passed aligns with historical trends; however, the content and origin of these laws reflect Milei’s distinct policy priorities and the residual influence of preceding governments.

Broader Context and Regional Comparisons

Argentina’s political and economic challenges are not unique. Other Latin American countries have also grappled with issues of executive overreach, legislative gridlock, and polarized electorates.

Milei’s governance style can be contextualized within this regional trend, where strongman tactics often emerge in response to systemic crises. However, the long-term implications of such approaches vary widely, depending on institutional resilience and public accountability mechanisms.

Conclusion

Javier Milei’s first year in office has been marked by an intensive use of presidential legislative tools such as DNUs and vetoes, aiming to bypass the limitations of a fragmented and oppositional Congress. While this strategy enabled progress on his agenda, it also raises questions about its implications for democratic institutionalism in Argentina. The interplay between the Executive’s assertiveness and the Legislature’s role will continue to shape Argentina’s political landscape in the years to come. The next stages of Milei’s presidency will likely test the limits of executive power and the adaptability of Argentina’s democratic institutions to a highly polarized political environment.