Fortunato Musella
In emergency times monocratic actors strengthen their position. Also in Italy, although the Constituents have been very cautious in providing with norms on possible suspension of parliamentary form of government after the end of fascist dictatorship, the dramatic phase[1] opened with the spread of Coronavirus has led the head of government to concentrate powers and normative instruments in his hands in an exceptional way. While trends in personal politics have led Italian democracy to constitute one of clearest example of the passage from particracy to the predominance of single political leaders[2], during the epidemic crisis the chief executive has dominated national decision-making by forcing ordinary legislative processes, and marginalizing – for necessity as well as political choice – other constitutional bodies.
The Prime Minister confirms himself as the protagonist of a silent Italian Constitution. Starting with Silvio Berlusconi in the 1990s, political leaders have developed a direct relationship with the electorate without any formal change of the constitutional charter. Since then, main indicators of legislative activities have shown an evident shift in power from the parliament to the executive, with a significant growth in the number of decree-laws as a relevant part of the overall legislation. The President of the Council of the Ministers has also started adopting autonomous decrees (DPCM) with increasing frequency and political impact, so relying on acts that have not been foreseen by the Italian Constitution directly. And they have been precisely such presidential decrees to constitute the principal channel that allowed the Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, to cope with Covid-19 Crisis in Italy in a speedy and independent way. Indeed, after Italy has joined the list of Coronavirus affected countries at the end of January, a decree-law[3] approved by the executive attributed to the head of government ample emergency power, so opening the room for a conspicuous number of Decrees of the President of the Council of Ministers (DPCM) – a term that will become of common usage for Italians.
The decisional paths followed during the Coronavirus epidemic have led Conte to assume the role of the only master in Italian emergency, despite of the enormous impact of adopted measures. In little more than a month, Conte signed ten presidential decrees through a deliberative procedure that does not involve the Parliament for approval, which however remained closed for several days because of the difficulty to meet the strong requirement of physical presence[4]. As a formally regulatory act, the DPCM does not allow the President of the Republic for any ex-ante check of constitutionality – as instead ruled by the constitutional charter for decree-laws issued in case of necessity and urgency (art. 77). Moreover, when the way of presidential decrees is taken, the principle of collegiality of the executive activities is also put aside in order to provide with a more rapid governmental action. Nevertheless, the decrees issued by Conte entered in very delicate spheres of citizen’s rights, from freedom of movement to economic enterprise, with relevant short and long period consequences. Italy has to face a terrible escalation of the infection: on February 23th a decree of the Prime Minister imposed restrictions in mobility to eleven municipalities in the province of Lodi in Northern Italy. Only two weeks after, Conte was obliged to extend such measures to several Italian regions, from Lombardy to Veneto and Emilia Romagna. Since March 4th schools and university have been closed on the national territory, and since March 8th Italy opted for national quarantine in the whole national territory, with people ordered to stay home and allowed to leave only for essential reasons. Such measures were followed in a few days by the generalized shutdown of the Italian production system. Some scholars have described the corpus of such dispositions as the largest suppression of constitutional rights in the republican history[5], though absolutely necessary according to most epidemiologists and commonly accepted by a population very frightened by the virus.
Prime ministerial decisional predominance has been also underlined by his increasing mediatic visibility. During the crisis Giuseppe Conte has often spoken to the nation though live-streamed press conferences in national television, or – to furtherly underline the autonomous and direct access to the public – through his personal Facebook page. By anticipating the protocols of official procedures, the decisional act is carried out through its instant communication via social media: as a tendency already observed, “after that the emergency decree had marked the rise of the prime ministerial executive, we have the immediate decree through tweet or Facebook which represents the supreme stage of presidential government”[6]. While since a few years ago one may have imagined that the Prime Minister would act and pronounce after intense confrontation with party representatives, Conte has seemed to offer a personal guidance across the crisis, with the only support of the inner cycle of scientific experts[7]. And, as revealed unanimously by national polls, the Prime Minister has strengthened his position in terms of their popularity rating, thanks to the efforts in facing the joint health and economic risks of the coronavirus.
In this time reinforcing authoritative leadership, it is not a case that the only counterpart to the decisional monopoly of the President of the Council has been represented by other monocratic actors, even if at a lower institutional level. Since the constitutional reform in 1999, the Presidents of Regions have become the highest political authority provided with direct legitimation in our country. In addition to this, the “governors” – as the press has begun to call the head of regional government with a (incorrect) reference to the US federal system – have been also entitled with the ample competences in the health domain that the Constitution allocates to the regional level of government. This is the reason why the Regional Presidents have very often intervened in the last weeks in integrating, reinforcing, or also contrasting Conte’s decisions, through the use of a relevant number of emergency orders, often disputable from a procedural point of view. More importantly, they have contended with the Prime Minister for mediatic scene: for instance, the President of Region Campania Vincenzo De Luca has attracted the attention of international media thanks to his vigorous actions to contain the spread of the epidemic contagion. Recently, the famous model Naomi Campbell has invited Americans to listen one of the governor’s speeches with its severe message against Coronavirus. Yet, on the other hand, after some days the ambassador of the United States declared to trust Giuseppe Conte, claiming he is a strong leader able to face the emergency like Donald Trump.
In the unexpected phase of pandemic, the Italian parliamentary democracy may reveal what it is: more and more the land of Presidents.
References
[1] A very unknow phase that, immediately after stimulating medical research to contrast the virus, has asked law and social science scholars to contribute. At the University of Naples Federico II, a large multidisciplinary research project has been launched by S. Staiano, titled “Legal and economic issues arising with coronavirus emergency and their consequences on political-institutional systems”.
[2] For an analysis of such processes see T. Poguntke and P. Webb, eds., The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005; Fortunato Musella and Paul Webb, eds,, The Personal Leader in Contemporary Party Politics, special issue Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica/Italian Political Science Review, 45, 3, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
[3] Decreto legge 23 febbraio 2020, “Misure urgenti in materia di contenimento e gestione dell’emergenza epidemiologica da COVID 19”
[4] N. Lupo, Perché non è l’art. 64 Cost. a impedire il voto “a distanza” dei parlamentari. E perché ammettere tale voto richiede una “reingegnerizzazione” dei procedimenti parlamentari, in Rivista AIC, 3, 31 marzo 2020, p. 10.
[5] The expression “Constitution in quarantine” was used by several constitutionalists, see C. Tripodina, La Costituzione al tempo di Coronavirus, in costituzionalismo.it, 1, 2020.
[6] M. Calise and F. Musella, Il Principe digitale, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2019, p. 107.
[7] This has put condition for a quite obscure decision-making process, as observed by B. Caravita, L’Italia ai tempi del coronavirus: rileggendo la Costituzione italiana, in federalismi.it, 18 marzo 2020.
