Ever since the first decade of the 20th century, the Brazilian diplomatic agency is widely-known for its profissionalism, bureaucratic insulation and political autonomy within the federal government. Brazil´s foreign policy over the last one hundred years has focused on internal economic development, not on territorial disputes with its neighbors. In this light, Brazilian diplomatic identity in the last fourty years was build on the values of autonomy, multilateralism, universalism and regional integration. The election of Jair Bolsonaro as president of Brazil has empowered the supporters of a radical rupture in the traditional foreign policy of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty).
In his speech on the night of the electoral victory, on October 28, 2018, Mr. Bolsonaro signaled that he intended to make changes in the direction of Brazilian foreign policy: “We will liberate Brazil and Itamaraty from international relations with ideological bias to which they have been submitted in recent years. Brazil will cease to be trimmed from the most developed nations (…) We will seek bilateral relations with countries that can add economic and technological value to Brazilian products. We will regain international respect for our beloved Brazil.”
In order to analyse the new diplomatic guidelines of Brazil as an internactional player ruled by an extremist right-wing government, it is necessary to know Mr. Bolsonaro and his closest advisor´s world views. Jair Bolsonaro has never been an active congressman on foreign affairs in his almost thirty years in the National Congress. His thoughts in foreign policy were limited to the criticism of the left governments in Cuba and Venezuela. In this light, his speeches in the last ten years strongly condemned the friendship of the Workers Party´s governments (2003-2016) with leaders such as Fidel and Raúl Castro, Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro.
The international trip of the candidate to the United States, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, at the beginning of 2018, outlined the first thoughts of his future government on foreign policy: the praise for Donald Trump’s nationalist leadership; the search for an alliance with right-wing governments in Latin America; the rapprochement with Israel; the mistrust with China, externalized on the trip to Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, which excluded Beijing, Brazil’s largest trading partner. Bolsonaro’s trip was designed to leverage his overseas popularity, approach with foreign investors and multiply domestic political support.
Faced with the difficulty in establishing alliances with other parties, who did not consider his candidacy feasible in the beginning, Mr. Bolsonaro chose Hamilton Mourão, a retired general of the Brazilian Army, member of a small party, as his Vice-President. General Mourão is one of Mr. Bolsonaro’s chief advisors among the military and also the expression of the strategic thinking of the Armed Forces in foreign policy. The apex of these autonomist views on foreign policy were implemented in the second decade of the military regime (1964-1985), specially during the government of general Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979). Although Mr. Geisel was a stauch anti-communist in domestic affairs, his government was the first to recognize the Marxist-Leninist government in Angola, seeking to secure oil sources for the Brazilian market. He was also the first Brazilian leader to condemn Israel at the United Nations General Assembly, which was an important step in approaching the Arab nations. It is worth mentioning the Geisel case to understand how Brazilian top officials of the Armed Forces values national security and autonomy. Invited by the President to assist him in the coordination of the government, the Vice-President has given frequent interviews to the national and international press, in which he also addresses issues of foreign policy.
The conversion of Jair Bolsonaro to economic liberalism approached him to a group of economists led by the ultra-liberal banker Paulo Guedes, PhD at University of Chicago. The pro-market economic policy sealed Bolsonaro’s approach with the business and financial sectors, both inside and outside Brazil. Guedes is a supporter of a more aggressive trade policy and a review of the Mercosur bloc. Considering the redesign of the ministerial structures, he will be one of the most powerful ministers in Brazilian history, with control not only over the treasury, the budget and the planning, but also over the design of the commercial and industrial policies. Mr. Guedes will have also the Ministry of Agriculture and the ruralist lobbies as important allies.
Eduardo Bolsonaro, the youngest son of Jair Bolsonaro, is the main leadership of PSL and the main architect of the foreign policy of the future government. An admirer of Donald Trump’s antiglobalism and of the conservative ideas of Olavo de Carvalho, a Brazilian right-wing writer exiled in the United States, he accompanied his father on his travels abroad and was his link with Steve Bannon, former head strategist of the White House and one of the ideologists of the Trump campaign. Eduardo Bolsonaro, Olavo de Carvalho and Filipe Martins, the young international advisor of PSL, supported the choice of Ernesto Araújo, diplomat and writer, as the new Foreign Minister. Mr. Aráujo is a diplomat recently promoted to ambassador, with no experience in leading a mission abroad. His ideas about foreign policy are far from the Itamaraty’s autonomist and universalist traditions.
When announcing the new Foreign Minister on Twitter, President Bolsonaro said that “Brazilian foreign policy must be part of the moment of regeneration that Brazil lives”. Ernesto Araújo advocates the need for a westernist and antiglobalist change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “I want to help Brazil and the world to free itself from the globalist ideology. Globalism is the economic globalization that has been piloted by cultural Marxism. It is an anti-anti and Antichristian system “(“Trump e o Mundo”, Cadernos do IPRI, n. 6, p. 323). In the view of the future minister, “Brazil – even if it does not want it – is part of the West, and this west is – even if it does not see it – in a conflict of gigantic proportions for its own survival “. In view of Itamaraty’s historical centripetal force as formulator and executor of the foreign policy, Itamaraty´s new chief may become the leading figure as the Brazilian international voice, after Mr. Bolsonaro.
Considering these ideological and cabinet choices, what can be predicted is that Bolsonaro’s foreign policy, at least in its initial phase, will be the most westernist and pro-American since general Castelo Branco´s government (1964-1967). Except from a short period after the military coup of 1964, Brazilian military presidents have implemented a more autonomous foreign policy, expanding the margins of maneuver of Brazil as one of the leaders of the so-called Third World. In this manner, the unilateral expansion of the territorial sea to 200 miles, the signing of the nuclear agreement with Germany and the cancellation of the U.S.-Brazil military agreement were decisions that have contradicted Washington’s security interests in South America.
What will be the limits of this alignment at a time of decline in Donald Trump’s leadership in the United States? How will the government cope with the pressures of domestic groups whose interests depend on other markets? Will the military and the Ministry of Economy support a more pragmatic international approach instead of an ideological foreign policy?
The most probable scenario point to a possible clash between three groups. First, the one of Minister Paulo Guedes, with a more commercialistic, liberal and pragmatic view. Second, the Armed Forces, represented by the Vice-President and the military ministers, who cherish the autonomous traditions of the Brazilian foreign policy. Third, the Foreign Minister and some of the representatives of PSL, headed by Mr. Bolsonaro´s son, in favour of a strong alignment with the US. Although the president’s party does not have a consistent ideology, the international advisor to the PSL, with little academic and political experience, seems to have a considerable influence on the decision-making process of the new foreign policy. The group of Paulo Guedes, seeking to maximize the reach of the Brazilian commercial agreements, and that of the military, concerned with strategic and national security issues, would make pressures to a flexibilization of the excessively ideological conduction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is also possible to foresee the possibility of the bureaucracy of Itamaraty, formed in multilateral and universalist traditions, seeks some form of alliance with the economic team and with the armed forces. In Palácio do Planalto, the President and his international advisory team will have to arbitrate the conflicts between these three groups.
In this sense, the foreign policy designed by the next government will have to deal with the clash between pragmatism and ideology. The emphasis on automatic alignments with the U.S. and the strong religious and nationalist tone demarcate choices that will have consequences in domestic and international terms. For example, breaking universalism in the name of ideological alignments, in a world where the dynamic axis moves to the Asia Pacific region, may have higher commercial costs than political gains. In another dimension, the transfer of the Brazilian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, as promised by President Bolsonaro, could jeopardize relations with Arab countries and put Brazil on the route of potential targets of Islamic terrorism. What the history of Brazil shows is that the national interest is not based on isolation or in automatic alliances, but on the active engagement in multilateral institutions and in the diversification of global partnerships to maximize the control of the Brazilian society over its national destiny.
Enrique Carlos Natalino – is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais – Brazil. He has a master’s in public administration at the João Pinheiro Foundation School of Government and a Degree in Law at the University of São Paulo (USP).
Disclaimer:
Responsibility for the information and views set out in this post lies entirely with the authors. Reproduction is authorized provided the source is acknowledged.